Red Team 5 Security Assessment Findings Report Event 2

A online banking system HTES AAS Factory4.0 project Webportal for managing climate systems Desktop chat application

Date: 14 December 2020 Project: Red Team Team 5 Version 2.0 Project members:

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
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Assessment Overview & scope



During the pentest the 5 red team groups equally handed out projects to pentest. For our group team 5 we had to research the following 3 projects:

System owner	Application Description	Test goals (as seen by the 'client')	test accounts for all roles in the system(s) (for whitebox testing)	ip-address(es) to test	VLAN
		See in teams			
		Documentation ->			
		Test object clarification Bart			
		Janssen			
		Data encryption,			
		,	See in 'teems		
			red blue chanel		
			->	10.10.2.125	
Janssen,Bart		MitM, 2FA, digital			
B.F.J.W.		0.		10.10.2.126	
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dent.fontys.nl>	application	from other users	Bart Janssen'	10.10.2.127	-VLAN


	1	1	Г	1	
			user account:		
			а. — — І		
			firstname: Red		
			lastname:		
			Team		
			password:		
			H@ckTh1s		
			admin account:		
		test the data			
Bommel, Marc M.			firstname: Red		
van		the input filtering,			
<marc.vanbommel< td=""><td></td><td>jwt authorization,</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></marc.vanbommel<>		jwt authorization,			
@student.fontys.nl			password:	10 10 1 110	1472_Client1
	_	-	N3wPages!	:4200	-VLAN
·	system	Passworu rules,	INSWFages!	.4200	
		See how far you			
		can get ;). First try			
		to hack some of			
		our systems, on			
		145.220.75.127			
		(accessible			
		without any VPN			
		(but it is			
		(strongly)			
		recommended to			
		use your own			
		VPN cause of			
		Seclab's outside			
		firewall). If you			
		give up, you could			
		ask me privately			
		questions (after			
		13.00 UTC+1), so			Vliet,
		that you can test			Geoffrey G.J.
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nt.fontys.nl>	Factory4.0 project	security.	pls.	127	ys.nl>

			Accounts can		
		input validation,	be registered in		
		authentication,	application,		
Saman, Youri Y.	Webportal for	authorization,	admin accounts		
<y.saman@student< td=""><td>managing climate</td><td>recaptcha at</td><td>are not</td><td></td><td>1473_Client2</td></y.saman@student<>	managing climate	recaptcha at	are not		1473_Client2
.fontys.nl>	systems	regestration	implemented	10.10.2.140	-VLAN

Findings

A online banking system

This application had a single fully working IP to connect to and that was 10.10.2.140. Using port 4200 it was obvious that the application ran an Angular project for anyone who had any experience with this platform (we would suggest changing the port and the tab icon).



[Figure 1.1 - ScanFindings]


On the first tcp scan some of the ports that stood out in addition to port 4200 were 5001 and 5341. We were able to access these 2 in spite of the fact that they contained developer knowledge about the API and a portal that was not listed for testing therefore not intended to the public.

→ C' û	× ☆ Preferences × + ① 10.10.1.110.5001/index.html#/login	···· 😇 🏠 🕷 🗇
	ng 🥆 Kali Tools 🥆 Kali Docs 🥆 Kali Forums 🥆 NetHunter 🚺 Offensive Security 🛸 Exploit-DI	B 🔦 GHDB 🚹 MSFU
Swagger.	Select a definition bank Se	rvice API v1 v
)ffer Ser	vice API 🚥 🏎	
agger/v1/swagger json		
		Authorize 🔒
Authenticatio	on	~
POST /Authenti	ication	Ĥ
POST /Authenti	ication/create	ŵ
BankAccount	t	~
POST /BankAcco	ount/transfer/{userId}	â
GET /BankAcco	punt	ŵ
POST /BankAcco	ount/transfers	â
GET /BankAcco	ount/{userId}	â
GET /BankAcco	ount/admin/transfers	â
Recaptcha		~
POST /Recaptch	ha	â
chemas		~

[Figure 1.2 - Port 5001- Swagger API]


If we had the userId we could perform bankAccount transactions or if we wanted we could make ourselves new accounts. This in itself is a high-level vulnerability and we suggest finding a way to hide the ports from scans.

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[Figure 1.3 - Swagger API testing the API endpoints]

To see if they are working we tried calling the API endpoint and created a new account / authentication details without needing a administrator account. As mentioned before this is a major vulnerability that is very easy to access.



[Figure 1.4 - Port 5341 - Seq]

Additionally, the other discovered port had a login page for what was believed to be a monitoring and alerting system of the application. The team tested it with bruteforcing, common passwords and sql injections and it did not open therefore it is well protected. But with a more extensive test period the login credentials could be obtained. We suggest hiding this port

-)→ C û	③ 10.10.1.110:4200/a	idmin/transfers				0 0	III\	=
🕻 Kali Linux 🦄 Kali Training	🔨 Kali Tools 🌂 Kali Do	cs 🥆 Kali Forums 🥆 NetHunte	r 🕅 Offensive Security	Exploit-DB	SHDB	MSFU		
from bankaccount		to bankaccou	nt			amount		
NL20B0CS9663609677		NL20B0CS1000	0687618			5.50		
NL20B0CS4949525848		NL20B0CS9663	3609677			15.00		

[Figure 1.5- Admin page]


While testing the admin page we realised that the webpage has no logout button, while this is not a vulnerability the team suggests the application owner invests in this functionality for better tests in the future.

In addition to this the create user functionality did not work or was on visible in the main/home page. Leaving us unsure if the functionality actually worked or not. Adding some kind of list of users in the admin page would help with this.

Also clicking or interacting with the recaptcha was not possible so we could not test it.

The overall suggestions would be to hide the swagger API page and the SEQ login page ports, change the port of the main application, add logout functionality and user lists in the admin page for testing purposes.

HTES AAS Factory4.0 project



[Figure 2.1 - Testing the given IP]

The first thing found was a login page for pfSense, we assume this is the firewall used. getting inside was not possible with default credentials.

```
TRACEROUTE (using port 25/tcp)

HOP RTT ADDRESS

1 0.54 ms pfSense.localdomain (10.10.1.1)

2 0.85 ms host-127.seclab.nl (145.220.75.127)

NSE: Script Post-scanning.

Initiating NSE at 11:43

Completed NSE at 11:43, 0.00s elapsed

Initiating NSE at 11:43

Completed NSE at 11:43, 0.00s elapsed

Initiating NSE at 11:43

Completed NSE at 11:43, 0.00s elapsed

Initiating NSE at 11:43


Completed NSE at 11:43, 0.00s elapsed

Initiating NSE at 11:43

Completed NSE at 11:43, 0.00s elapsed

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
```

[Figure 2.2 - Sanning for additional ports or information] After scanning the given IP we were able to discover that the firewall was placed in the test environment in seclab. This is not a vulnerability but we did investigate further.



[Figure 2.3 - Inspecting the seclab ip]

Upon inspection some general information was found from inspecting the seclab ip nothing major but we could see the server type and programming language of the firewall.

root@kalivn	n: ~			•	•	0
ile Edit View Search Terminal Help						
<pre>>ot@kalivm:~# nmap -sC -sV -oA testThingy 1 carting Nmap 7.80 (https://nmap.org) at 2 gmentation fault</pre>		13:36 C	ET			
ot@kalivm:~#						
SIGN IN						
Username						
Password						
SIGN IN.						
and mitinitized by Norgens 19 88F 2004 - 2020 Vent Forma						

[Figure 4.0 - Scanning the internal firewall]

Security Strengths

- Use well known supported frameworks such as Angular and SpringBoot with standard security measures built in (In case of Angular anti XSS protection).

Security Weaknesses

- Missing some multi-factor authentication, that can make hackers life's harder while trying to perform brute force attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

- Keep software up-to-date to prevent malicious users from using exploits targeting already known vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

During this day we had trouble setting up the pentesting environments since the pentesting machines provided by Fontys were outdated and we had to solve connectivity issues because of the load on the seclab.

Overall there is not much functionality to test which is unfortunate for us. In general it allowed us to practice our skills acquired during our studies once more. We hope that for a next event like this, we can come even more prepared and that there are no problems with the systems to be tested.